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PUNCH CARD BALLOTS V. DIRECT RECORD
ELECTRONIC VOTING: WHY OHIO’S USE OF
DIFFERENT METHODS TO COUNT BALLOTS
VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

STEWART V. BLACKWELL, 356 F. SUPP. 2D 791
(N.D. OHIO 2004).*

Jason W. Hilliard**
I.

INTRODUCTION

After the 2000 presidential election was decided in Florida by a
difference of less than the statistical margin of error in that state, the old
saying that every vote counts never seemed more relevant.1 As the Florida
Board of Elections scrambled to manually recount the ballots, however, the
mantra among legal scholars of “one-person, one-vote”2 seemed to be cast
into doubt.
Problems with “hanging chads” and “butterfly ballots”3 brought the
___________________________________________________________________
*Prior to publication, the Sixth Circuit reversed and adopted much of the same reasoning proposed by the
author of this Note. See Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 2006 Fed. App. 0143P (6th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the lower court should have applied strict scrutiny, but concluding that punch card ballots
violate Equal Protection even under a rational basis review).
** Executive Editor for Publication 2006-2007, Staff Writer 2005-2006, University of Dayton Law
Review; J.D./MPA expected May 2007, University of Dayton School of Law; B.A. in Social and
Political Studies, Wilmington College 2003. This author would like to thank Richard B. Saphire for his
insight, as well as editors Mary Walsh and Melissa Winter for their hard work. Special thanks to Paul
Moke for his teaching and inspiration.
1
Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and
Ensuing Litigation, 2000 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 3, 36, 38 (2000) (finding that machine error accounted for almost
0.5 percent, and in addition, there were estimates of over 170,000 voters who improperly cast ballots
state wide, while the difference between the two candidates was less than 0.5 percent); see also Daniel P.
Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1711, 1725
(2005) (noting that nationwide statistics indicated that over two percent of ballots did not register a vote
for President in 2000).
2
Jessica Post, Uniform Voting Machines Protect the Principle of “One-Person, One-Vote,” 47 Ariz. L.
Rev. 551, 562-75 (2005) (arguing that using different voting technology is contrary to the idea of “oneperson, one-vote,” and urging equality in the procedures and mechanisms used for voting).
3
Tokaji, supra n. 1, at 1713 (pointing out that problems with punch card ballots and “hanging chads”
prompted much litigation and legislation); see also Steven J. Mulroy, Substantial Noncompliance and
Reasonable Doubt: How the Florida Courts Got it Wrong in the Butterfly Ballot Case, 14 Stan. L. &
Policy Rev. 203, 204-29 (2003) (explaining the legal and practical problems with “butterfly ballots”);
Caltech/MIT Voting Tech. Project, Voting: What is and What Could Be 17,
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flaws of punch card balloting systems to the forefront. One Supreme Court
decision4 and an act of Congress5 later, some states continue to use punch
card balloting.6 In fact, many states employ several different methods of
voting technology that produce various margins of error.7 The likelihood of
having your vote counted in those states is entirely dependent upon which
county or precinct in which you live.8
In Stewart v. Blackwell,9 the Northern District Court of Ohio ruled
that the use of punch card ballots in some counties and electronic
technology in others does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.10 The Court applied the rational basis test,11 and
found that the difference in residual votes12 in counties using punch cards in
comparison to those using electronic technology was de minimis,13 despite
the clear statistical evidence to the contrary.14
This Note will argue that using punch card ballots in some counties
while using electronic voting in others does violate the Equal Protection
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/july01/July01_VTP_Voting_Report_Entire.pdf (accessed
Mar. 16, 2006) [hereinafter Caltech/MIT] (noting that due to the Florida controversy, problems with
“butterfly ballots” and “dangling chads” became part of the national lexicon).
4
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (ruling that Florida’s use of different methods of re-counting
votes violated the Equal Protection Clause, and commenting on the problems of punch card ballots).
5
Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 15301-15523) (provides federal money to states to replace punch cards with new voting technology).
6
Nineteen million voters used punch cards in the 2004 election. In Ohio alone, punch cards were used
by seventy-two percent of the voters. Tokaji, supra n. 1, at 1738-39.
7
Paul M. Swartz, Voting Technology and Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 625, 634 (2002) (finding that
the failure rate for various voting technology used within the same state ranges from less than one
percent to over six percent).
8
Tokaji, supra n. 1, at 1756 (explaining the “dramatic” intrastate disparities due to differences in voting
technology).
9
356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
10
Id. at 807-10. The Court also held that using different voting technology did not violate the Due
Process Clause or the Voting Rights Act. Id.
11
The rational basis test is the most deferential standard of review employed by the Supreme Court
when analyzing an Equal Protection claim. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 43940 (1985) (defining the rational basis test as it applies to Equal Protection). Applying this test, the Court
will presume the constitutionality of the law or classification, and uphold it so long as it is “rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.” Id. at 440; see also Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational
Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living Center, 88 Ky. L.J. 591 (2000) (providing a general
discussion of rational basis as it applies to modern Equal Protection judicial review).
12
A residual vote is a vote that is not counted. Caltech/MIT, supra n. 3, at 20 (explaining residual
votes). It is a catch-all term for over-votes and under-votes. Id. An over-vote occurs when someone
accidentally votes for two candidates for the same office. Id. An under-vote happens when a voter
accidentally or purposefully fails to cast a vote for a particular office. Id.
13
De minimis is Latin for “of the least.” Black’s Law Dictionary 464 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West
2004). It is defined as “trifling, minimal,” or “so insignificant that a court may overlook it in deciding an
issue or case.” Id.
14
According to the statistics in Ohio, you are three times as likely to have your vote excluded if you live
in a punch card county. Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 806.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol31/iss3/6

2006]

STEWART V. BLACKWELL

529

Clause and that the strict scrutiny test15 should have been applied. Using
Bush v. Gore, where the United States Supreme Court decided that
employing different methods to re-count votes is an Equal Protection
violation,16 this Note will argue that the original counting of votes should be
as well.
The next section outlines the types of voting technology used in the
United States, and examines the problems with punch card ballots. It also
will discuss the reaction to the 2000 presidential election and the trend
toward newer electronic voting technology. Finally, it provides a summary
of the holding in Bush v. Gore, and describes the cases involving claims of
an Equal Protection violation where counties used various forms of voting
technology. Section III discusses the holding in Stewart v. Blackwell, and
argues that the Court should have applied the strict scrutiny test and found
an Equal Protection violation. Section IV will conclude that due to the
significant statistical disparity between electronic voting and punch cards,
the Court should have found an Equal Protection violation, regardless of
what level of scrutiny it applied.
II.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

Voting technology has come a long way. From voice votes and
paper ballots to punch cards and direct record electronic machines (“DRE”),
innovation has led to more efficient, accurate, and reliable systems.17 While
there are currently five different methods to cast a vote in the United States,
___________________________________________________________________
15

The strict scrutiny test gives no deference to the government, and carries with it a strong presumption
that the classification is not constitutional. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (defining the strict
scrutiny test). This test is implicated when a suspect class or fundamental right is involved. Id. The
government must show that the law or classification is necessary to achieve a “compelling governmental
interest.” Id. The law or classification must also be “narrowly tailored” so as to be the least
discriminatory means available to achieve that government interest. Id. Several voting rights cases have
employed language strongly suggesting the use of strict scrutiny though others contend that the level of
scrutiny depends upon the burden placed on the right to vote. Id.; see also Harper v. Va. St. Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964)) (ruling that
due to the fundamental interest in voting, “‘any alleged infringement . . . must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized’”); but see Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (finding that the level of
scrutiny varies with the burden placed on the right to vote). Several commentators have argued that Bush
v. Gore employed strict scrutiny. See Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection
Law in Elections, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 377, 396 (2001) (stating that Bush v. Gore “mandate[s] strict
scrutiny”); Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke, Litigating Bush v. Gore in the States: Dual Voting Systems
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 51 Vill. L. Rev. 229, 258-67 (2006) (arguing that Bush v. Gore used
strict scrutiny); Steven J. Mulroy, Lemonade From Lemons: Can Advocates Convert Bush v. Gore Into A
Vehicle For Reform? 9 Geo. J. on Pov. L. & Policy 357, 372-74 (concluding that given the Court’s
discussion of the fundamental nature of the right to vote, the Bush opinion employed strict scrutiny).
16
531 U.S. at 103.
17
Tokaji, supra n. 1, at 1717-24 (exploring the reliability of various methods of voting); Swartz, supra n.
7, at 633-38 (briefly describing the voting systems employed by voters).
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punch cards, DREs, and optical scan systems are the most prevalent.18
Problems with punch cards were known for some time,19 but the
2000 presidential election brought the issue to the public’s attention.20 The
election prompted studies,21 legislation,22 and a Supreme Court opinion.23
The consensus was that punch card ballots disenfranchise voters due to their
high rate of error.24 Quickly, states began to replace their punch card
systems with more reliable technology.25 Some states, however, have not
made the change.26 Several lawsuits were initiated to force these states to
stop using punch card technology.27 An Ohio case, Stewart v. Blackwell,
was the first of these cases to be heard on its merits.28
A.

From Throwing Balls to Punching Holes

The word ballot comes from an ancient Italian word for ball, while
___________________________________________________________________
18
In 2004, DREs were used by almost thirteen percent of voters, and optical scans were used by over
thirty percent. Tokaji, supra n. 1, at 1737. Punch card usage was almost tied with mechanical lever
machines at over thirteen percent each, while less than one percent of voters still used hand counted
paper ballots. Id.
19
Roy G. Saltman, Accuracy, Integrity, and Security in Computerized Vote-Tallying §§ 1.7.2, 3.4.4,
http://www.itl.nist.gov/lab/specpubs/500-158.htm (accessed Mar. 16, 2006) (this 1988 study
recommends that counties discontinue the use of punch card ballots altogether due to their inaccuracies);
see also Alan M. Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice: How the High Court Hijacked Election 2000, at 27
(Oxford U. Press 2001) (quoting a 1982 patent application by the manufacturer stating that punch cards
can clog up so as to prevent a clean punching operation, which leads to “serious errors” in data
processing).
20
See Political Staff of the Wash. Post, Deadlock: The Inside Story of America’s Closest Election (Public
Affairs 2001) (discussing the overwhelming media coverage of the event).
21
See generally Henry E. Brady et al., Counting All the Votes: The Performance of Voting Technology in
the United States, http://ucdata.berkeley.edu:7101/new_web/countingallthevotes.pdf (accessed Mar. 16,
2006).
22
116 Stat. at 1666.
23
Bush, 531 U.S. at 158.
24
Eric A. Fischer, Voting Technologies in the United States: Overview and Issues for Congress 14-18,
http://www.eng.yale.edu/debates/CRS%20Voting%20Technologies.pdf (accessed Mar. 16, 2006) (this
commission suggested a national uniform voting system, and spoke of the attributes of DREs); see also
Spec. Investigations Div. of Minority Staff of H.R. Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong., Income and
Racial Disparities in the Undercount in the 2000 Presidential Election 7 (July 9, 2001),
http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/20040629065057-51969.pdf (accessed Mar. 16,
2006) (determining that punch cards disenfranchise minority voters) [hereinafter Income and Racial
Disparities].
25
A number of states have banned punch card ballots, and the overall trend has been away from punch
cards. Tokaji, supra n. 1, at 1739. In the 2000 election, forty-four million voters (one in three) used
punch card systems, while only nineteen million used DREs. Id. In 2004, however, DREs were used by
forty-six million voters, while only nineteen million were still using punch card ballots. Id.
26
Id. at 1740 (pointing out that in Ohio, seventy-two percent of voters still used punch cards in 2004).
27
Com. Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2001); S.W. Voter Registration Educ.
Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 920 (9th Cir. 2003); Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 902
(N.D. Ill. 2002). For a discussion of these cases, see infra § II.A.
28
356 F. Supp. 2d 791.
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casting refers to throwing.29 Indeed, in early Greece, votes were cast by
throwing a ball into a clay pot or box of the candidate of your choice.30
Though the first paper ballots were used in Rome as early as 139 B.C.E., the
United States used a system of “voice voting”31 well into the early
nineteenth century. During this time, votes were cast by simply calling out
your choices which were duly noted by the clerk.32
There was no right to secret ballot, and voter registration was
accomplished by swearing on the Bible, and having the voters’ names
recorded by the clerk.33 The clerk did not record who each individual voted
for, but simply kept a running tally of how many votes had been cast for
each candidate.34 Thus, there was no real way for a candidate to contest an
election, or have their votes re-counted. Voter fraud occurred frequently,
and over-voting only occurred when someone would return several times to
cast their ballot.
By the early nineteenth century, paper ballots began to appear in the
United States.35 Originally, they were blank slips of paper provided by the
voters with the names of the candidates they wished to support.36 Before
long, candidates and political parties began pre-printing their own paper
ballots.37 This practice was originally contested, but eventually became the
norm by the late nineteenth century.38 The concern over preprinted ballots
was their lack of privacy and potential for fraud.39
___________________________________________________________________
29
Douglas W. Jones, A Brief Illustrated History of Voting,
http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/ (accessed Mar. 16, 2006).
30
Id.
31
Id. The first use of a paper ballot in the United States was in 1629 to elect a pastor of a Salem,
Massachusetts church, but paper ballots were not widely used until the late eighteenth century. Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. A scanned copy of a record kept by a clerk shows the general practice whereby the voter’s name
was recorded, but not their choice. Id. Instead, a running tally of votes cast for each candidate appeared
at the top. Id.
35
Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States 14243 (Basic Books 2000).
36
Jones, supra n. 29.
37
Political parties used distinctive paper in order to identify how people voted. Saphire & Moke, supra
n. 15, at 236. Votes were often exchanged for jobs, and some were required to vote for certain
candidates in order to keep their jobs. Id.
38
Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. 312, 323 (Mass. 1830). In this case, the High Court decided to finally
allow the use of preprinted paper ballots which had been rejected in the past. Id.
39
Worth Robert Miller, Harrison Count Methods: Election Fraud in Late 19th Century, Locus: Regional
and Local History (1995) (available at http://history.missouristate.edu/wrmiller/Populism/texts/
harrison_county_methods.htm (accessed March 28, 2006)) (discussing voter fraud in relation to
preprinted ballots); Joseph P. Harris, Election Administration in the United States (George Banta Publg.
Co. 1934).
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These concerns came to fruition in the presidential election of 1876.
In that election, Rutherford B. Hayes eventually won a contested electoral
vote, though he clearly lost the popular vote.40 Much like the 2000 election,
this close vote brought the problems of voting technology to the public’s
attention.41 Stories of votes not being properly counted led to congressional
hearings. In one instance, a poll worker admitted to ignoring the ballots
completely and simply having his ward bosses announce the winner.42 By
1888, during another disagreement between the popular vote and Electoral
College, reports of widespread voter fraud led the United States to seek new
voting technology.43
The Australian secret ballot was introduced to remedy these
problems.44 With this system, a preprinted ballot allowed voters to place a
mark beside the name of their preferred candidate. The Australian ballot
greatly enhanced voter privacy and significantly reduced voter fraud. Much
like the problems in the 2000 election, however, determining voter intent
was sometimes impossible.45 Further, with the ever increasing voter
population, it was becoming infinitely more difficult to count the ballots.46
The problem of counting the votes was solved a few years later with
the introduction of mechanical lever voting machines (“AVM”).47 These
machines allowed the voter to line up the ballot and pull a lever to cast their
vote.48 The total for each candidate was tallied instantly.49 Though quick
and efficient, AVMs easily jammed up, left no individual voter trail, and
were bulky and hard to store.50 Despite these problems, AVMs became the
___________________________________________________________________
40

Louise Story, Election Hints at Years Past, Yale Daily News (Nov. 13, 2000) (available at
http://www.yaledailynews.com/article.asp?AID=13613 (accessed Mar. 16, 2006)). Originally, both the
electoral vote and the popular vote were cast for Samuel Tilden, but contested elections in three states,
including Florida, held up the final vote. Id. This election was eventually decided by an electoral
commission, which only cast the votes for Hayes when Republicans agreed to remove troops from the
South. Id.
41
Jones, supra n. 29.
42
Id.
43
Id. In this election, Grover Cleveland won the popular vote, but Benjamin Harrison was alleged to
have paid off some of those in the Electoral College in order to claim victory. Id.
44
Saphire & Moke, supra n. 15, at 236 (commenting on the privacy afforded by the Australian ballot);
see also Richard Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1506, 1518 (2002) (noting
that by the late nineteenth century, the “secret ballot” was adopted to prevent fraud).
45
The ballots required check marks, and where the check strayed from the line or did not slant properly,
the vote may not be counted. Jones, supra n. 29.
46
Australian ballots are still used in rural areas, and accounted for 1.5 percent of voters in 2000, but only
0.6 percent in 2004. Tokaji, supra n. 1, at 1737.
47
Fischer, supra n. 24, at 3 (explaining the AVM).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Saphire & Moke, supra n. 15, at 237 (stating that the major problem with the AVM was that it was
bulky and expensive to store).
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dominant voting technology by the mid-twentieth century.51
Due to their inexpensive and portable nature, punch card systems
quickly replaced AVM’s as the most popular apparatus used to cast a vote in
the United States.52 The reliability problems with the punch card system,
however, have led many states to move away from this technology.53
Originally introduced by IBM in the 1960s, punch cards provide a portable,
inexpensive, and efficient way to cast votes.54 The system employs the use
of a stylus to punch holes in a card containing pre-scored, perforated chads
corresponding to the names of the candidates.55 A beam of light then counts
the open spaces left in the card.56
The pre-scored cards themselves do not contain the names of the
candidates.57 The names appear on a separate booklet mounted on the
Votomatic or data-punch machine.58 The card is inserted and aligned in the
machine, and the voter then punches the holes corresponding to their
candidate of choice.59
Though the quick and efficient nature of the punch card ballot was
immediately recognized, so were the system’s many problems.60 Punch card
machines quickly clog up with chads, making it difficult to completely
perforate the hole.61 If one of the holes is not punched through completely,
the tabulator will not read it.62 This creates the problem of under-voting.63
This problem is exacerbated during a manual re-count.64 Hand re___________________________________________________________________
51

Jones, supra n. 29.
Brady et al., supra n. 21, at 12 (noting that punch card systems became very popular because of their
low cost and speed).
53
Punch card ballots were used by thirty percent of voters in 2000, but only thirteen percent of voters
used punch cards ballots in 2004. Tokaji, supra n. 1, at 1737.
54
Jones, supra n. 29.
55
Saphire & Moke, supra n. 15, at 237 (discussing punch card systems).
56
Id.
57
Fischer, supra n. 24, at 3-4. There are two types of punch card systems. Id. at 3. The main type,
“Votomatic,” does not list the candidate’s names on the actual card, while the second type, “Datavote,”
does have their names on the card. Id. at 4. The Datavote makes up only a small percentage of punch
cards, and was only used by four percent of precincts in 2000. Id.
58
Marshall Camp, Bush v. Gore: Mandate for Electoral Reform, 58 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 409, 44546 (2002) (explaining the differences between Datavote and Votomatic machines).
59
Tokaji, supra n. 1, at 1720.
60
Saltman, supra n. 19, at 11 (1988 study recommending that the use of punch cards “be ended”);
Caltech/MIT, supra n. 3, at 7 (pointing out that IBM quickly recognized the problems with punch cards
and stopped producing them).
61
Dershowitz, supra n. 19, at 27.
62
Id.
63
Under-voting occurs where a vote is not registered for a particular office. Tokaji, supra n. 1, at 1720.
64
Dershowitz, supra n. 19, at 20-30 (explaining the difficulty in determining voter intent).
52
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counts require the tabulators to determine voter intent.65 The problem is
whether or not to count hanging, dimpled, penetrated, or pregnant chads.66
That is, there is no way to determine whether or not the voter intended to
cast the vote.67
Another prevalent problem with punch cards is voter confusion.68
Some punch card ballots make it difficult for voters to understand exactly
for whom they are casting their vote.69 This problem is compounded
because once a voter removes their card, there is no way for them to know
who they actually voted for.70 Because there are no names on the actual
card, if the card was not properly aligned in the machine, the holes punched
by the voter might be casting a vote for a candidate they did not intend.71
Over-voting is another product of voter confusion.72 This occurs
where someone accidentally casts a ballot for more than one candidate for
the same office.73 As an example, a butterfly ballot in Florida led an
alarming number of citizens to punch the wrong hole, thereby casting a vote
for the wrong candidate.74 Others, seeing the names of both the presidential
and vice-presidential candidates listed together, punched a hole for each,
which actually cast a vote for two different presidential candidates.75 Such
instances of over-voting are particularly problematic, and unique to punch
card systems.76

___________________________________________________________________
65

Id.
Id. at 28 (explaining the various forms of chad problems).
67
Though they might have intended the vote, perhaps they thought about it and changed their mind or
realized that they were about to cast a vote for the wrong candidate. Intentional under-voting, where the
voter intentionally does not cast a vote for a candidate, also is a possibility. Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 24 (explaining the problems with butterfly ballots).
70
Tokaji, supra n. 1, at 1720 (explaining that Votomatic cards do not have the candidates’ names on
them).
71
Id.
72
Dershowitz, supra n. 19, at 24-25.
73
Id.
74
The final vote had Bush winning by 537 votes. Id. at 25. It was estimated, however, that in just one
heavily Democratic county, the butterfly ballot caused 5,330 votes intended for Gore to be thrown out
because they were unintentionally cast for him and another candidate, Pat Buchanan. Id. This does not
include an additional 2,908 that were likely intended for Gore that were accidentally cast for the Socialist
candidate whose hole was just below Gore’s. Id. In this instance, voter’s thought that they were voting
for Gore and Lieberman. Id. One Jewish lady who accidentally voted for Buchanan was reported as
stating, “I would rather have had a colonoscopy than vote for that son of a bitch Buchanan.” Id. at 25.
75
A lady told the Washington Post that, “I voted for Gore, but I also voted for the vice president. I
punched two holes instead of one.” Id.
76
Tokaji, supra n. 1, at 1720 (explaining the unique problems of Votomatic punch cards).
66
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To combat these flaws, optical scan systems were introduced.77
Similar to taking the ACT or SAT, voters use a pencil to fill in the box
corresponding to their choice.78 Less confusing and just as efficient, optical
scan machines reduce residual voting significantly.79 Another great feature
is that the tabulation machine notifies voters when they have under-voted or
over-voted.80
The latest technological advancement in voting has been the DRE.81
Much like an ATM, voters use a touch screen computer to cast their vote.82
The machine makes it impossible to over-vote and notifies a voter when
they have under-voted, making unintentional under-votes impossible as
well.83 Before a ballot is cast, a verification screen shows the voter who
they have voted for, giving them a second chance to check their ballot and
make changes as necessary.84
Many states, including Ohio, also have a feature that creates a voter
verified paper trail in case of machine malfunction.85 Due to the high
accuracy of the DRE machines, and the significant problems with punch
cards, many states have gotten rid of their punch cards in favor of the DREs
over the past six years.86
B.

The Numbers Game

Much like the 1888 election, the close election of 2000 prompted a
number of legislators and scholars to take a hard look at the way we cast our
votes.87
Immediately following the 2000 presidential election, the
___________________________________________________________________
77
Optical scan systems were used by roughly thirty percent of voters in 2000 and thirty-six percent in
2004. Id. at 1721.
78
Jones, supra n. 29.
79
Tokaji, supra n. 1, at 1721-22.
80
Id. Only precinct optical scan systems where the tabulation is done on site give notification of an
instance of over/under-voting. Id. Central tabulation systems do not. Id.
81
In 2000, 10.7 percent of voters used this technology, increasing to nearly thirty percent by 2004. Id.
82
Brady et al., supra n. 21, at 14.
83
Id. at 14 (noting that DRE systems “do not allow overvotes”); Caltech/MIT, supra n. 3, at 23 (finding
that miscounting is virtually impossible with DREs).
84
Camp, supra n. 58, at 446 (pointing out that not only do DRE systems prevent over-voting, but they
also provide confirmation of selections, and give voters a chance to make corrections).
85
Ohio H. 262, 125th Gen. Assembly, 2004-05 (May 7, 2004) (requires a certified paper trail).
86
In election 2000, forty-four million voters (one in three) used punch card systems, while only nineteen
million used DREs. Tokaji, supra n. 1, at 1738. Four years later, however, those numbers flipped. In
2004, DREs were used by forty-six million voters, while only nineteen million were still using punch
card ballots. Id.
87
Caltech/MIT, supra n. 3, at 17 (one of the major studies conducted after the election); see also Post,
supra n. 2, at 553 (though many remember that Gore won the popular vote, but lost the electoral vote
after losing Florida by 537 votes, many forget how close some other states were. In Iowa, New Mexico,
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Commission on Civil Rights conducted an investigation of the voting
irregularities in Florida.88 Their report concluded that nearly three percent
of the votes cast in Florida (180,000) were not counted.89 A majority of
these were over-votes caused by punch cards.90 The Civil Rights
Commission recommended that Florida discontinue the use of punch cards,
and enact legislation requiring electronic technology.91
A nationwide study conducted by Caltech/MIT estimated that four
to six million presidential votes were lost in 2000 due to poorly functioning
punch card balloting systems.92 The study found that counties using punch
card systems had residual voting rates fifty percent higher than counties
employing better technology.93 The Caltech/MIT study also suggested
replacing punch cards with electronic technology.94
A subsequent examination by a congressional committee agreed that
the problem was prevalent throughout the nation and that electronic
technology should replace punch cards.95 The Carter-Ford Commission
found the number of uncounted votes to be directly correlated to poor voting
technology, but urged for statistical benchmarks as a basis for determining
what type of technology to employ.96
Heeding the call for statistical benchmarks, the University of
California at Berkley adopted a scale to indicate what percentage of residual
voting should be tolerated.97 Counties with less than one percent should be
considered “good,” while those between one and two percent are
“adequate.”98 Anything above two percent is “worrying,” and where
residual votes exceed three percent, the Berkley study found that number to
be “unacceptable.”99

and Wisconsin, the difference between the candidates was less than 0.5 percent. In Georgia, South
Carolina, Illinois, Wyoming, and Idaho, the percentage of over-votes and under-votes significantly
exceeded Florida).
88
U.S. Commn. on Civ. Rights, Voting Irregularities in Florida During the 2000 Presidential Election,
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/ch1.htm (accessed Mar. 16, 2006) [hereinafter USCCR].
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Caltech/MIT, supra n. 3, at 3.
93
Id. at 21. A residual vote is a term used to describe both over and under-votes combined. Id., see also
supra n. 12
94
Id.
95
Income and Racial Disparities, supra n. 24, at 9.
96
See generally Fischer, supra n. 24 (suggesting uniform technology).
97
Brady et al., supra n. 21, at 22. Berkley actually adopted a scale originally proposed by the National
Commission on Federal Election Reform. Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
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The federal response to the problem was the Help America Vote Act
(“HAVA”).100 Early drafts of the bill proposed uniform standards and better
technology.101 Eventually, however, it became watered down causing many
of its initial proponents to vote against it.102 Though the language of HAVA
seems to encourage states to get rid of punch cards, it does not require it.103
HAVA does provide money for states to replace punch card systems, and
many states acted quickly to secure the funding to improve their
technology.104
Florida became the first state to ban the use of punch card
technology in 2001, and using money from HAVA, the state had every
precinct using optical scan or electronic voting by 2002.105 California also
passed similar legislation and got rid of most of their punch card ballots by
2001.106 Both Maryland and Georgia passed legislation banning any type of
voting equipment except for DREs.107
Before the 2004 election, most states had moved away from punch
card ballots.108 In the 2000 election, forty-four million voters (one in three)
used punch card systems, while only nineteen million used DREs.109 Four
years later, those numbers flipped. In 2004, DREs were used by forty-six
million voters, while only nineteen million were still using punch card
ballots.110
A few states, including Ohio, did not make the transition. In 2000,
seventy-four percent of Ohio voters used punch card ballots, which only
decreased to seventy-two percent in 2004.111 Ohio continues to have a high
number of residual votes that could be avoided.112 In Georgia, for example,
the state went from primarily using punch cards in 2000 to only DREs in
___________________________________________________________________
100

116 Stat. at 1666.
Saphire & Moke, supra n. 15, at 242-52 (generally discussing the legislative history of HAVA).
102
Id. at 21-25 (commenting on the problems that some lawmakers had with the final draft).
103
Brian Kim, Help America Vote Act, 40 Harv. J. on Legis. 579, 589 (2003) (explaining how states may
opt out of replacing punch cards).
104
Congress earmarked $325 million to replace punch cards. Id. at 589.
105
Tokaji, supra n. 1, at 1730-32.
106
Id. at 1731.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 1737.
109
Id. at 1738.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 1739.
112
See James Dao, Voting Problems in Ohio Spur Call for Overhaul, N.Y. Times A1 (Dec. 24, 2004);
Adam Liptak, Voting Problems in Ohio Set off an Alarm, N.Y. Times 37 (Nov. 7, 2004); DNC, Ohio
Voters Plagued by Systemic Problems on Election Day 2004, Federal News (June 22, 2005) (all
discussing the voting problems in Ohio).
101
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2004.113 The percentage of residual votes went from 3.5 percent
(unacceptable), to 0.39 percent (good).114 In Ohio, residual voting between
2000 and 2004 remained stagnant at over two percent.115 Sixty-nine of
eighty-eight counties in Ohio still use punch card ballots and maintain
residual voting percentages up to eight percent, while the average residual
voting percentage in the five counties that use DREs is less than one
percent.116
C.

Bush v. Gore

The outcome of the 2000 presidential election depended upon which
candidate won Florida.117 The final vote count had George W. Bush beating
Al Gore by less than 0.5 percent of the vote, while the number of votes
excluded by punch card machines exceeded three percent.118 By statute,
Vice-President Al Gore was entitled to a manual re-count.119 The Florida
Secretary of State set a deadline of November 14 for the re-count to take
place.120 It became clear, however, that more time would be needed to
conduct the re-count and the Florida Supreme Court moved the date to
November 26.121
The United States Supreme Court vacated this order, and the
canvassing board certified the election.122 Gore challenged the certification,
and the Florida Supreme Court ordered a manual re-count of all of the
votes.123 In Bush v. Gore, the Court halted the manual re-count, holding that
it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.124
Thus, the Bush Court ruled that a state violates the Equal Protection Clause
where there are no uniform standards to re-count votes, which leads to votes
in one county being counted differently than in others.125
The Bush Court stated that when the state legislature vests the right
to vote in its people, the right is “fundamental” and its “fundamental nature
___________________________________________________________________
113

Tokaji, supra n. 1, at 1740.
Id. at 1739.
115
Id.
116
Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 813.
117
Dershowitz, supra n. 19.
118
Bush, 531 U.S. at 101 (acknowledging that the margin of victory was less than 0.5 percent); USCCR,
supra n. 88 (noting that nearly 3.93 percent of punch card votes were not counted in Florida).
119
Bush, 531 U.S. at 101.
120
Id.
121
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 74 (2000).
122
Id. at 72-78.
123
Dershowitz, supra n. 19, at 35.
124
Bush, 531 U.S. at 103-11.
125
Hasen, supra n. 15, at 378-79.
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lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to
each voter.”126 This indicated that the Court intended to use the strict
scrutiny test.127 In beginning their Equal Protection analysis, the Court
noted that “[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State
may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote
over that of another.”128
The Bush Court went on to quote Reynolds v. Sims, stating that the
right to vote can be denied by “debasement or dilution of the weight of a
citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting” it.129 The Court
concluded that the absence of specific standards to re-count votes led to
“unequal evaluation of [the] ballots.”130 Bush relied in part upon their ruling
in Moore v. Ogilvie,131 where a county-based procedure diluted the influence
of citizens in other counties in a presidential race.132
The decision in Bush v. Gore immediately came under fire.133 First,
the Court applied the Equal Protection Clause where there was no
standing.134 That is, no individual voter or class of voters who were harmed
by the re-count could be identified. Next, the Court seemed to, for the first
time in this context, consider voting a fundamental right thereby subjecting
it to strict scrutiny.135 Though in previous cases the Supreme Court used
strict scrutiny where African Americans were disenfranchised, they had
never applied it where a non-suspect class was involved.136 Finally, the
Court did not find purposeful discrimination, as the majority writers had
___________________________________________________________________
126

Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
There is disagreement over the type of scrutiny the Court employed in Bush. In applying the Equal
Protection Clause, however, the Bush court quoted from two cases where it is generally agreed that strict
scrutiny was used. Id. at 104-05; see Harper, 383 U.S. at 667; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62 (both
finding that any infringement on the right to vote must be “carefully and meticulously scrutinized”). The
Bush court went on to say that the re-count mechanisms did not even “satisfy the minimum requirements
for non-arbitrary treatment,” leaving the possibility open for some to argue that the rational basis test was
used. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05; see Hasen, supra n. 15, at 396 (stating that Bush v. Gore mandates strict
scrutiny); see also Saphire & Moke, supra n. 15, at 258-67 (arguing that Bush v. Gore used strict
scrutiny); Mulroy, supra n. 14, at 372-74 (concluding that the Bush opinion employed strict scrutiny).
128
Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05.
129
Id. at 105.
130
Id. at 106.
131
394 U.S. 814 (1969).
132
Id. at 818-19.
133
Dershowitz, supra n. 19, at 5 (pointing out the extensive criticism of the Bush decision).
134
Id. at 77-81 (noting that a review of Equal Protection Supreme Court cases finds that there was always
a cognizable victim, and that Justice Antonin Scalia has refused to hear cases where a victim could not be
ascertained).
135
Dershowitz, supra n. 19, at 75-77 (stating that the Court did not follow existing precedent and
“invented this application of the right”).
136
Hasen, supra n. 15, at 390 (finding that no Rehnquist Court opinion had ever relied upon Reynolds or
Harper to expand the franchise in such a way).
127
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before required.137
Curiously, the solution for the apparent violation was to stop the recount.138 In voter dilution cases, the Supreme Court would typically fashion
a remedy to correct the problem.139 Here, the Bush Court could have easily
set forth standards for re-counting votes. The Bush Court could have even
remanded the case and allowed Florida to come up with standards. Instead,
the Bush Court chose to simply stop counting. The Bush Court also
attempted to limit their decision to the “present circumstances.”140 Finally,
the Bush Court decided in an area almost exclusively reserved to the states
by interpreting a state election law, and overturning the interpretation laid
out by Florida’s highest court.141
D.

Prior Cases

The Bush v. Gore case spawned many lawsuits challenging the use
of punch card ballots. In fact, the Bush decision seemed to encourage such
suits. In Bush, the Court wrote about the “problem of equal protection in
election processes”142 and seemed to be concerned with the fact that “2% of
ballots cast did not register a vote for President.”143 The Court also found
that “punch card balloting machines can produce an unfortunate number of
ballots” which are not counted, and “legislative bodies nationwide will
examine ways to improve the mechanisms and machinery for voting.”144
The first case was Common Cause v. Jones, where California
___________________________________________________________________
137
Though some of the Justices only require a disparate impact, the Justices writing for the majority in
Bush had always insisted upon purposeful discrimination. Dershowitz, supra n. 19, at 75-78. Justice
Clarence Thomas, who joined the majority opinion, once commented, “‘[t]he Equal Protection Clause
shields only against purposeful discrimination: A disparate impact, even upon members of a racial
minority . . . does not violate equal protection.’” Id. at 147 (quoting M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 135
(1996)).
138
In all prior voting rights cases where an Equal Protection violation was found, the Court remedied the
situation so that the voters were not disenfranchised. Dershowitz, supra n. 19, at 76; see also Reynolds,
377 U.S. 533 (fashioning a remedy whereby districts are determined by population and thus the vote
cannot be diluted).
139
See supra n. 134 and accompanying text.
140
Bush, 531 U.S. at 109; see also Dershowitz, supra n. 19, at 123 (pointing out that Scalia has written
“[t]he Supreme Court of the United States does not sit to announce unique dispositions. Its principle
function is to establish precedent”); Hasen, supra n. 15, at 386-87 (finding that the limiting language in
Bush was a strong deviation from the Court’s usual practice in election cases, and suggesting that it will
be used as precedent anyway).
141
Dershowitz, supra n. 19, at 145-50 (quoting several Justices who had always refused to hear cases
where states’ rights were involved, and also pointing out cases where interpretations of state voting laws
by state courts would not be heard by the Supreme Court).
142
Bush, 531 U.S. at 103.
143
Id. at 109.
144
Id. at 104.
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residents alleged that punch card ballots were not reliable, and individuals in
counties where punch cards were employed were effectively denied the right
to vote.145 The plaintiffs pointed out that while only half of the voters used
punch card ballots, these voters accounted for three-fourths of the votes
thrown out.146 The Common Cause court denied the defendant’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings, and echoed Bush v. Gore, referring to the right
to vote as fundamental.147
The Common Cause court went on to note that even if a rational
basis review were conducted, the fact that the Secretary of State allows
counties to choose punch cards or more reliable means is unreasonable.148
The Secretary of State, suspecting that he would lose the case, decertified
the punch card equipment in the state, thereby rendering the litigation
moot.149
California planned to replace their punch cards before the 2004
election, but Governor Davis was recalled in 2003.150 This meant that an
election had to take place before 2004, and the state had not yet purchased
enough DREs. This led to another case, Southwest Voter Registration
Education Project v. Shelley,151 where the plaintiffs sought an injunction to
stop the recall until the punch cards could be replaced.152 In essence, they
argued that the punch card ballots which were decertified by the Secretary
of State could not be used.153
The district court, using a backward approach of the strict scrutiny
test, determined that the state had a “compelling interest in not
disenfranchising the voters” who wanted the recall, and that “the limited use
of punch cards . . . [was] a narrowly tailored means to achieve that end.”154
This decision was quickly overturned on appeal. The Ninth Circuit stated
that plaintiff’s “equal protection claim is much the same as the one in Gray
v. Sanders” and “almost precisely the same issue as the Court considered in

___________________________________________________________________
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213 F. Supp. 2d at 1107.
Mulroy, supra n. 15, at 539.
147
Com. Cause, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1108.
148
Id. at 1109.
149
Saphire & Moke, supra n. 15, at 282 (noting that the Secretary of State decertified the punch card
equipment in the nine counties that were the subject of the litigation).
150
S.W. Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 916-17.
151
278 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
152
Id. at 1133.
153
Id. at 1141.
154
Id.
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Bush.”155 The court stopped the recall.156
A week later, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed itself in a rare en
banc opinion, deciding that the original decision by the district court was not
an abuse of discretion.157 In this way, the Shelley court avoided the
constitutional question, and bailed the Supreme Court out of having to
address their decision in Bush v. Gore.
While the California cases were being litigated, a similar case, Black
v. McGuffage, arose in Illinois.158 The statistical disparity in that state was
worse than in California. According to their complaint, while error rates
remained below one percent in counties using DREs and optical scan
technology, Chicago had an error rate over seven percent.159 The Black
court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.160
The Black court quoted Bush calling the right to vote fundamental
and rejected the contention that the Bush opinion should not be applied.161
The Black court held that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an Equal
Protection violation where voters in punch card counties were “statistically
less likely” to have their votes counted.162 Black did not address whether
strict scrutiny should be applied, because it appeared as though using punch
cards was arbitrary and could violate Equal Protection even under a rational
basis standard of review.163 Though it seemed the case would be heard on
its merits, the parties settled out of court before the case went to trial.164
E.

Stewart v. Blackwell

Stewart v. Blackwell became the first case challenging punch card
ballots to be heard on its merits.165 Mirroring prior cases brought in
California and Illinois, voters in Ohio alleged that the use of punch card
ballots violated the Equal Protection Clause.166 Though the Stewart court
___________________________________________________________________
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S.W. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882, 895 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 913.
157
S.W. Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 920.
158
209 F. Supp. 2d 889.
159
Id. at 893.
160
Id. at 902.
161
Id. at 898.
162
Id. at 890.
163
Id. at 897-99.
164
ACLU of Ill., Current Legal Docket, http://www.aclu-il.org/legal/docket.shtml (accessed Mar. 16,
2006) (noting the judicial approval of a series of agreements to replace punch cards).
165
Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 801.
166
Id. 807-09. The plaintiffs also claimed that the use of punch cards violated the Voting Rights Act and
Due Process as well. Id.
156
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cited the rulings from the California and Illinois cases, as well as the Bush v.
Gore decision, the Stewart court questioned the standing of Ohio voters, and
decided that the rational basis test should be applied.167 The Stewart court
also determined that the statistical difference between counties using DREs
and those using punch cards was de minimis.168 Therefore, the court held
that there was no Equal Protection violation.169
III.

ARGUMENT

This Note will argue that the Stewart court should have applied the
strict scrutiny test, and found an Equal Protection violation. Though the
Stewart court correctly declared that the right to vote was fundamental, they
ignored the ruling in Bush v. Gore by applying the rational basis test. Even
applying the rational basis test, however, the Stewart court should have
concluded that differences in counties using punch card ballots and those
using DREs were significant, and continuing to use punch cards is
unreasonable under any standard of review.
A.

The Stewart Court’s Ruling

At first, Stewart v. Blackwell seemed like it might come to the same
fate as its predecessors when the Secretary of State agreed to use money
from HAVA to replace the punch card ballots with electronic voting.170
Accordingly, the Court issued a stay to allow Ohio to phase out the use of
punch cards.171 The Ohio General Assembly did not get the funding they
expected from HAVA, however, and Secretary J. Kenneth Blackwell
refused to decertify punch card ballots.172 Thus, it became clear that punch
cards would still be used in the 2004 election, and the Court agreed to hear
the case.173
The plaintiffs relied heavily on statistical data and four expert
witnesses to support their contention that the use of punch card ballots
diluted voting power in counties that used them.174 The data showed that
___________________________________________________________________
167

Id. at 804.
Id. at 807.
169
Id. at 808.
170
Id. at 820. The Secretary of State stated that punch cards should be phased out to avoid a Florida-like
calamity in a letter to the President of the Ohio Senate, Doug White. Tr. Ex. 24, Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d
791.
171
Saphire & Moke, supra n. 15, at 287.
172
Id. at 288.
173
Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 792-94.
174
Id. at 792-96.
168
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counties using DREs maintained less than a one percent error rate, while
counties employing punch cards ranged anywhere from two to eight
percent.175 Recall that a rate of error below one percent is considered good,
while two percent is worrying, and anything over three percent is
unacceptable.176
Thus, the plaintiffs contended that the statistical
differences between counties employing various voting technologies was
unacceptable and amounted to an Equal Protection violation.
The defense, using their own statistics and experts, focused on prior
elections and emphasized under-voting that could have been intentional.177
Their strategy was to dispute the plaintiffs’ numbers and skew the results.178
The defense also exposed the fact that several counties in Ohio did not keep
accurate records of their votes.179 That is, some counties separated undervotes from over-votes while some did not.180 Therefore, the defense sought
to combine the statistics for over and under-voting.
The plaintiffs allowed the over-votes and under-votes to be
combined under the catch-all term “residual votes.”181 This was a major
concession by the plaintiffs, because combining over and under-votes does
not accurately reflect the disparity between the two technologies. For
example, in just three counties, it was estimated that there were close to
7,000 over-votes, while none of the counties using DREs had a single overvote.182 DREs do not allow over-voting.183 This means that there is no error
rate for over-voting. DREs do allow for under-voting, because in some
instances, people may not want to cast a ballot for a particular office. When
someone does under-vote, however, the DRE machine informs the voter that
they have done so, thereby eliminating any unintentional under-voting.184
Punch cards allow for both over and under-voting, and do not
inform the voter when they have under-voted.185 Therefore, there is no way
to determine if they were intentional or unintentional. Due to Ohio’s
inadequate statistical records, there was no way to know how many overvotes occurred in certain counties, and the plaintiffs were forced to combine
___________________________________________________________________
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Id. at 795, 806-25.
Brady et al., supra n. 21, at 22.
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Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 797-98.
178
Saphire & Moke, supra n. 15, at 289-91.
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Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 804.
180
Id.
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Id. at 803.
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Saphire & Moke, supra n. 15, at 287.
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Brady et al., supra n. 21, at 14.
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Id.
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Dershowitz, supra n. 19, at 19-28.
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the numbers.186
This concession allowed the defense to argue that because there was
no way to tell whether someone had under-voted intentionally or not, there
was no way to differentiate human from machine error.187 The two sides
finally agreed upon numbers that heavily favored the conclusions of the
defense experts.188 The numbers still established a statistically significant
difference between counties using punch cards and those using DREs.
It was agreed that in the 2000 election, 2.3 percent of the votes cast
in counties using punch cards were thrown out, compared to 0.7 percent of
those using DREs.189 That is, for every 1,000 votes cast, twenty-three were
excluded using punch cards while only seven were excluded using DREs.
Of the seven excluded by DREs, the plaintiffs argued that these were
intentional under-votes.190
Judge David Dowd began his opinion by commenting that in all his
years he had never had any trouble with punch cards, and even where one
makes a mistake, they have the opportunity to check their work.191 The
Stewart court wrote that a “careful voter has every opportunity to scrutinize
his or her ballot after removal from the voting tray to determine if a mistake
has been made in the context of . . . a mistaken vote.”192
Next, the court responded to the defense argument that the plaintiffs
lacked standing because no individual voter could state that their vote was
not counted, by writing “[t]he court is of the view that the defendants have
the better argument on the issue of standing, but declines the invitation to
dismiss.”193
Beginning the Equal Protection analysis, the Stewart court quoted
Bush, stating that “once a state has granted its citizens the right to vote, it
___________________________________________________________________
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Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 807-08.
Id. at 811-14.
188
Id. at 806.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 800.
191
Id. at 824-27. There are two kinds of punch card systems used. Fischer, supra n. 24, at 3. The main
type, Votomatic, does not list the candidate’s names on the actual card, while the second type, Datavote,
does. Id. at 4. Seventy-three counties in Ohio use the Votomatic. Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 824-27.
Only one county uses the Datavote. Id.
192
Id. at 807. This statement is simply wrong. As mentioned, no matter how careful someone is using a
Votomatic punch card, they still will not recognize when they have over-voted once the card is removed.
193
Id. at 802.
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‘may not . . . value one person’s vote over that of another.’”194 The court
then curiously decided that the rational basis test should be applied, and
concluded that where the Ohio General Assembly has any rationale for
using punch cards in some counties and DREs in others, there is no
violation.195
The court noted that they need not identify a rationale, but insisted
that cost savings was a reasonable factor.196 The court further pointed out
that the statistical differences in counties using different technology was de
minimis, and also concluded that “if this court were to apply strict scrutiny,
the court’s ruling would be the same.”197 Therefore, the Court ruled that
there was no Equal Protection violation.
B.

Analysis

The Stewart court incorrectly applied the rational basis standard of
review. Numerous Supreme Court cases have held that the right to vote is
fundamental.198 The Supreme Court has specifically stated that laws that
impair or infringe upon the right to vote must be “carefully and meticulously
scrutinized.”199 In Bush, the Supreme Court reaffirmed their stance that
voting is a fundamental right, and any law that inhibits voting is subject to
strict scrutiny.200 Moreover, the Bush Court concluded that using different
methods to re-count votes in different counties was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.201
Though the Stewart court correctly determined that the right to vote
is fundamental, they incorrectly applied the rational basis standard of
review. In doing so, the court ignored a long line of Supreme Court
precedent. The Stewart court came to this conclusion based upon its
misunderstanding of punch card ballots and Equal Protection jurisprudence.
Finally, even if the Stewart court applied the correct standard of review, it
still came to the wrong conclusion, because the use of punch cards is
unconstitutional under any standard of review.
___________________________________________________________________
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Id. at 808.
Id. at 804.
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Id. at 808-09.
197
Id. at 804-10.
198
See Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533; Harper, 383 U.S. 663; Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 390 (1963); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 349 (1962).
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Harper, 383 U.S. at 667.
200
Hasen, supra n. 15, at 396 (stating that Bush v. Gore mandates strict scrutiny); Saphire & Moke, supra
n. 15, at 258-67 (arguing that Bush v. Gore used strict scrutiny); Mulroy, supra n. 15, at 372-74
(concluding that the Bush opinion employed strict scrutiny).
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The Stewart court’s statement that every voter using punch cards
can check for errors after they remove their card from the tray illustrates the
court’s unfamiliarity with punch card voting.202
The names of the
candidates are not listed on the Votomatic punch card,203 and once the card
is removed, there is no way of telling who you voted for and who you did
not.204
During the trial, one of the experts attempted to explain this to the
court. Judge Dowd responded that “the voter using the punch card always
has the option of pulling out the punch card, looking at the holes that are
punched and comparing them to the people or issues they wish to vote
for.”205 He went on to say, “I have been doing that for 30 years so I know
it’s possible.”206 If Judge Dowd truly believes this, contrary to his
contention that he has had no trouble voting, perhaps some of his own votes
might have been discarded.
The Stewart court’s comment on the issue of standing is also
misplaced. It is true that the United States Supreme Court has often rejected
Equal Protection claims where there was no one who could claim injury.207
In Bush, however, there was no identifiable voter that was injured in Florida,
and the majority did not have a problem with this standing issue.208 The
Stewart court cites Bush approvingly and therefore cannot dispute the
standing issue.
The Stewart court specifically cites Bush when it begins its Equal
Protection analysis as well.209 In one instance, the Stewart court quotes
Bush, finding that one person’s vote cannot be valued over another’s.210 In
the very next sentence, however, the Stewart court concludes that the
rational basis test should be applied.211 Thus, Stewart ignores the precedent
___________________________________________________________________
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established by the case they cite.
To come to the conclusion that the rational basis test should be
employed, the Stewart court cites from a dissenting opinion in Bush.212 The
problem is that the Stewart court applies the Bush majority opinion’s Equal
Protection analysis, but then cites to Justice David Souter’s dissenting
opinion, which questions the majority’s application of Equal Protection.213
Though not mentioned by the Stewart court, Justice Souter’s dissent also
argued that the Bush Court should have remanded the case so that Florida
could fashion a remedy wherein the state would use “uniform standards” to
count the votes, because using different methods is “arbitrary.”214
Stewart concludes, without discussion, that had it applied the strict
scrutiny test, the court would have come to the same result.215 Had Stewart
applied strict scrutiny, however, the result clearly would have been different.
The only reason offered in the Stewart opinion is that punch cards are “cost
effective.”216 The Supreme Court has never found that something being
cost-effective is a compelling governmental interest. More importantly,
DREs are arguably more cost-effective than punch card machines.217
When applying strict scrutiny, it also must be shown that the use of
punch cards is the least restrictive means available.218 Disenfranchising
sixty-nine of eighty-eight Ohio counties and seventy-two percent of voters is
not narrowly tailored to achieve a cost-effective interest. Further, Ohio has
received funding from HAVA to replace their punch cards, and the fact that
their long term cost is comparable to DREs, establishes that this is not the
least restrictive means available.219
Even applying the rational basis test, the Stewart court should have
found that the use of punch cards was irrational and therefore violated Equal
Protection. Under a rational basis review, a court may still find a law to be
___________________________________________________________________
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unconstitutional where the law inhibits a constitutional right and is arbitrary
and unreasonable.220
The Stewart court’s conclusion that using punch cards is not
arbitrary and unreasonable is based upon its determination that the statistical
differences between counties using DREs (0.7 percent) and punch cards (2.4
percent) is de minimis.221 Thus, the court determines that being three times
as likely not to have your vote counted is not a significant disparity. The
court ignores that of the 5,700,000 voters in Ohio, replacing punch cards
with DREs could eliminate close to 96,800 lost votes. The exclusion of
nearly 100,000 voters is not de minimis.
In Black, the court commented that based on similar statistics, the
use of punch cards was so arbitrary that it did not make a difference what
standard of review was used.222 Similarly, in Common Cause, the court
found that if allowing some counties to use punch cards while others used
DREs created statistically significant differences, it would be “irrational.”223
Finally, in Southwest Voter Registration Education Project, the Ninth
Circuit noted that the Secretary of State had already decided that using
punch cards was “unacceptable.”224 Thus, the Stewart court not only
overlooks the decision in Bush, but also ignores several federal cases which
held that the use of punch cards was irrational and could violate Equal
Protection under any standard of review.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Stewart court’s decision to apply the rational basis test in a case
of voter dilution and outright disenfranchisement ignores the Supreme Court
decision in Bush v. Gore. By concluding that a statistical disparity whereby
one is three times as likely not to have their vote counted is de minimis, the
Stewart court has left little room for citizens to challenge the use of voting
equipment that significantly dilutes their voting power. In an era where
presidential elections can be decided by just a few hundred votes, the
Stewart court has determined that using punch card ballots in some counties
and DREs in others, thereby disenfranchising millions of voters, is
constitutional.
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